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Abstract
This article investigates how distinct tiers of firms contribute to value creation and value capture
in the automotive industry. We employ firm-level indicators to evaluate the value creation and
capture of distinct supplier tiers in the Czech automotive industry, while considering differences
between foreign-owned and domestic firms. Our analysis suggests that the economic effects of
the automotive industry largely depend on its capital intensity and that mostly foreign-owned
higher tier firms generate and capture greater value than lower tier firms, which include the vast
majority of domestic suppliers.
Keywords
Automotive industry, value creation, value capture, Czechia

Introduction
The contemporary automotive industry is typiﬁed by vertically integrated production
networks organized by large lead assembly ﬁrms, in which the majority of components
production is outsourced to independent suppliers (Sturgeon et al., 2008). Component
suppliers are hierarchically organized into supplier tiers that diﬀer by the complexity of
manufactured components and also by other ﬁrm-level characteristics, such as ﬁrm size
and the corporate power they wield in production networks (Humphrey and Memedovic,
2003; Pavlı́nek and Janák, 2007; Sturgeon and Lester, 2004).
In this article, we investigate how these distinct tiers of automotive ﬁrms contribute to
value creation and value capture in the automotive industry by seeking answers to four
questions. First, we ask whether higher tier ﬁrms create and capture a higher value than
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lower tier ﬁrms; second, whether higher tier ﬁrms possess stronger and more diverse
competencies than lower tier ﬁrms; third, whether higher tier ﬁrms import a higher or
lower share of inputs from abroad than lower tier ﬁrms; and fourth, whether domesticowned (henceforth domestic) ﬁrms import lower shares of inputs than foreign-owned
(henceforth foreign) ﬁrms (Frigant and Lung, 2002; Gereﬃ et al., 2005; Humphrey and
Memedovic, 2003; Maxton and Wormald, 2004; Mudambi, 2008; Pavlı́nek, 2015; Pavlı́nek
and Janák, 2007; Pavlı́nek and Žı́žalová, 2014; Sturgeon et al., 2008).
We investigate these relationships between the ﬁrm’s position in global production
networks (GPNs) and its prospects for value creation and capture in the context of the
Czech automotive industry, which represents an example of an ‘‘integrated peripheral
market’’ (Humphrey and Oeter, 2000). These are peripheral regions that have been
integrated into core-based automotive industry production networks through large inﬂows
of foreign direct investment (FDI) by foreign transnational corporations (TNCs).
Automotive TNCs seek to beneﬁt there from low production costs, investment incentives,
and the advantages of regional economic blocs. The peripheral position of the Czech
automotive industry in the European automotive industry is typiﬁed by its foreign control
(82.4% of employment, 92.4% of value added, and 94.5% of turnover in 2011), which is also
reﬂected in the limited presence of corporate headquarters and strategic higher value-added
functions (Pavlı́nek and Ženka, 2011).
Our goal in this article is to develop an approach to measure value creation and capture in
regional production networks based on ﬁrm-level indicators. We deﬁne value creation as
ﬁrm-level activities that increase the value of ﬁnal goods or services compared to the value of
raw materials, intermediate goods, services, and other expenses employed for their
production. We measure value creation at the ﬁrm level by value added in production and
labor productivity. Value capture refers to the amount (or share) of created value that is
retained by ﬁrms or subsidiaries that originally created it and that has not been transferred
outside the host region of those ﬁrms or subsidiaries. As such, it is composed of two basic
components: value captured by ﬁrms that created it and value that ‘‘leaks’’ from these ﬁrms
to other subjects in the host region. We evaluate value capture through wages, tax revenues,
reinvestment, and domestic sourcing. The measurements are done for diﬀerent supplier tiers
and for foreign and domestic suppliers in order to evaluate the contribution of diﬀerent types
of ﬁrms to value creation at the ﬁrm level and value capture at the ﬁrm and regional levels
since we are interested in the contribution of the automotive industry to regional economic
development. Our analysis conﬁrms that higher tier ﬁrms have greater economic eﬀects than
lower tier ﬁrms because of the larger capital intensity of their production, higher corporate
tax revenues, and also higher average wages per worker. However, lower tier ﬁrms have
larger direct employment and wage eﬀects per unit of production.
We begin with a brief discussion of value creation and capture in the contemporary
economy. In the following section, we develop a ﬁrm-level approach to evaluate value
creation and value capture in the context of the automotive industry. In ‘‘Hypotheses’’
section, we present ﬁve hypotheses about the distinct tiers of the automotive value chain
that guide our empirical analysis of the Czech automotive industry. In the following section,
we introduce the Czech automotive industry. Next, we analyze value creation and capture in
the Czech automotive industry. Finally, we summarize the ﬁndings in the conclusion.

Value creation, value capture, and uneven economic development
The international spatial division of labor has been increasingly inﬂuenced by the investment
activities of TNCs and their abilities to ‘‘slice up’’ the value chain and relocate its diﬀerent
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functions to the potentially most proﬁtable locations (Dicken, 2011; Gereﬃ, 2005).
Economic geographers, among others, have been attempting to uncover where value is
created and captured within GPNs in order to understand how GPNs contribute to
economic development of particular countries and regions (Coe et al., 2004; Smith et al.,
2002) and how ﬂows and transfers of value contribute to uneven development (Hudson,
2011). It has been argued that in the contemporary economy the greatest value creation and
capture come from the production of intangible goods rather than from the production of
tangible goods and standardized services. Both upstream and downstream knowledgeintensive activities along the value chain, such as R&D on one side and brand
management, marketing, advertising, distribution, and after-sales service on the other
side, create and capture signiﬁcantly greater value than manufacturing operations
(Mudambi, 2008). Lead ﬁrms typically control the production of intangible goods and
thus secure higher proﬁts through creating high entry barriers into these activities (Shin
et al., 2013). Empirical evidence was found in the electronics industry that brand owners,
who are almost invariably large core-based TNCs, capture the majority of value that is
created along a particular value chain, while ﬁrms that manufacture ﬁnal products
capture a much lower share (Shin et al., 2012).
The automotive industry represents an example of increasingly complex transnational
production networks and value chains (Sturgeon et al., 2008). While it diﬀers from the
electronics industry in that lead (assembly) ﬁrms have not outsourced the ﬁnal vehicle
assembly to subcontractors or contract manufacturers, external suppliers have increased
their share of the total value of ﬁnished vehicles to 75–80% (Frigant, 2011a). This does
not mean, however, that external suppliers also capture the same share of the created value
in the value chain. Lead ﬁrms along with leading component suppliers have been
increasingly shifting production to lower cost ‘‘emerging’’ economies while maintaining
crucial knowledge-intensive and high value-added activities in their home countries
(Pavlı́nek, 2012; Sturgeon et al., 2008; Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck, 2011). Since
automotive production networks are no longer predominantly organized at the national
scale (Dicken, 2011; Hudson and Schamp, 1995), the international ﬂows of value within
the automotive industry have increased rapidly in the form trade, FDI, and proﬁt shifting
strategies.
The spatial distribution of economic activities with diﬀerent value creation and capture
potential has important regional development implications. Economic geographers and
economists have demonstrated that higher value-added knowledge-intensive activities and
corporate control functions tend to concentrate in more developed core regions while lower
value-added production activities tend to concentrate in less developed peripheral regions
(Dicken, 2011; Hymer, 1972; Massey, 1979). This spatial division of labor is closely related
to the patterns of corporate ownership and control (Dicken, 1976; Firn, 1975; SchackmannFallis, 1989). In the context of manufacturing, it means that peripheral externally controlled
branch plants typically specialize in the high-volume manufacturing while having very
limited nonproduction functions. Such truncated branch plants have limited regional
development beneﬁts for their host regions and, in the long run, might contribute to
technological underdevelopment of host economies (Britton, 1980; Hayter, 1982). In the
automotive industry, this continues to be the case despite its reorganization of production
and supplier relations in the 1980s and 1990s (Sheard, 1983; Womack et al., 1990), which
allowed some peripheral branch plants to acquire nonproduction functions and upgrade into
‘‘performance/networked branch plants’’ (Amin et al., 1994; Dawley, 2011; Phelps, 1993;
Pike, 1998). Although branch plants and ﬁrms based in peripheral regions might develop
various competencies over time (Phelps, 1993), functional upgrading resulting in a
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signiﬁcantly improved position of such ﬁrms in the automotive industry value chain has been
extremely diﬃcult to achieve (Pavlı́nek and Ženka, 2011; Pavlı́nek and Žı́žalová, 2014).
Therefore, especially domestic automotive suppliers based in peripheral regions and
countries have been increasingly relegated to the bottom of the supplier hierarchy, which
translates in the production of simple, low value-added, standardized and slow changing
components (Barnes and Kaplinsky, 2000; Humphrey, 2003; Humphrey et al., 2000).
Overall, the prevailing spatial division of labor in the automotive industry suggests that
peripheral regions, both at the national and international scale, are typiﬁed by lower
value creation within global value chains (GVCs) and GPNs than core regions.
Furthermore, external control contributes to a potential value transfer from peripheral
branch plants to corporate headquarters in the form of various proﬁt shifting strategies,
including proﬁt remittances and transfer pricing (Dischinger et al., 2014a, 2014b).

Value creation and value capture in GPNs
The precise measuring of value creation and capture in GPNs has proven to be extremely
diﬃcult because it requires access to the internal accounting data of individual ﬁrms, such as
invoice-level internal data (Seppälä et al., 2014). Firms are generally unwilling to provide
this information and even if they do, this level of detail would likely limit the analysis to a
single product produced by a single TNC. Because of the unavailability of precise data,
analyses of value creation and capture in GPNs of particular products in electronic
industries, such as Apple’s iPods, notebook computers, and smartphones, had to rely on
rough estimates (Dedrick et al., 2010, 2011). It would be diﬃcult to apply these approaches
in the context of complex production networks with thousands of suppliers, such as the
automotive industry, unless we focus on only a few of the most important suppliers.
Alternatively, econometric methods have been used to measure value capture at the
national level using ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial data in the electronic industry (Shin et al., 2013).
In this article, we develop an alternative way to measure value creation and capture in
regional production networks based on ﬁrm-level indicators.
In the GPN perspective, created value refers to various forms of economic rent
(Coe et al., 2004), which is conceptualized as the super proﬁt of an entrepreneur who is
able to exploit either resources of above average productivity or ubiquitous resources more
eﬀectively than his or her competitors (Kaplinsky, 1998), while preventing them from
exploiting these resources by creating high barriers of entry (Kaplinsky and Morris,
2008). Proﬁts therefore represent a plausible way to measure value creation (Coe et al.,
2004; Henderson et al., 2002; Kaplinsky, 2000).1 However, proﬁts are highly volatile as
they are aﬀected by various investment projects, corporate tax reliefs, proﬁt repatriations,
transfer pricing, and other proﬁt shifting strategies (Dischinger et al., 2014b). Proﬁts can be
reinvested in production in order to upgrade a ﬁrm’s or subsidiary’s production processes,
which might increase its overall productivity, wages, and corporate tax revenues in the long
run. The (geographical) distribution of proﬁts along the hierarchical value chain (Gereﬃ
et al., 2005) does not necessarily correspond with the distribution of value added. Through
transfer pricing, TNCs can allocate the largest share of their proﬁts to subsidiaries with
simple low value-added assembly, while subsidiaries with high value-added production may
show a negligible or even negative proﬁtability (Seppälä et al., 2014). Therefore, from the
perspective of regional development, created value needs to be understood more broadly and
should not be limited to proﬁts. In addition to proﬁts, created value is also reﬂected in
technological and organizational innovations, eﬀective collaboration with local suppliers,
knowledge spillovers, agglomeration economies, and the local presence of strategic high
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value-added functions. Diﬀerent automotive ﬁrms are linked through complex supplier
relationships and ﬂows of information within automotive production networks that
encourage the spatial proximity of certain automotive suppliers to assembly operations
(Frigant and Lung, 2002; Larsson, 2002). The need for proximity and the resulting
savings that accrue to individual suppliers lead to their clustering around assembly plants
(Pavlı́nek and Janák, 2007; Sturgeon et al., 2008). Therefore, the value creation and capture
of individual ﬁrms might be aﬀected by the fact of whether or not they are located within
such clusters. For the purpose of this study, we therefore consider not only value created in
an individual automotive ﬁrm, but also estimates of value creation and capture in the
network of the ﬁrm’s regional suppliers, which are induced by domestic sourcing,
knowledge spillovers, and other mechanisms.
Since there is no simple and established way to measure value creation, we employ the
gross value added (GVA) as the best available accounting indicator for quantifying the
abstract and directly nonmeasurable category of created value. GVA includes not only
pretax proﬁts that are highly volatile, diﬃcult to trace and interpret, but it also measures
wages and the consumption of ﬁxed capital. As such, it is a more complex, territorially
bounded, and stable indicator than proﬁts that can be more easily interpreted. GVA per
employee (labor productivity) is a key indicator of economic upgrading (Milberg and
Winkler, 2011) in terms of productivity and proﬁtability.
What is the diﬀerence between value added and created value? The conceptualization of
value inspired by the resource-based theory (Peteraf, 1993) distinguishes between the
perceived use value and exchange value. The former refers to speciﬁc qualities of the
product (component, material, machine, service, etc.) as subjectively perceived by
customers and the price he or she is prepared to pay for it (Bowman and Ambrosini,
2000). The latter is the actual price paid by the buyer for this perceived use value.
Therefore, value creation represents the accumulation, transformation, and appropriation
of valuable resources (machines, materials, components, know-how, technologies, licenses,
management practices, etc.) that increase the perceived use value of a ﬁrm’s products. When
these products are sold, perceived use value is transformed into (exchange) value added
(Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000).
From a host region perspective, captured value is a part of value created by the resident
ﬁrm or subsidiary that is retained and appropriated for host region beneﬁts (Coe et al.,
2004). Regional captured value is composed of two parts. First is value captured for the
beneﬁts of the resident ﬁrm or subsidiary, which is the share of proﬁts that a ﬁrm invests in
its upgrading in order to maintain or increase its competitiveness (Szalavetz, 2015). It has
multiple forms, such as reinvested proﬁts, employee skills, collaborative relationships with
local suppliers, technological innovation, and all other sources of economic rents that are
retained by the resident ﬁrm or subsidiary and are not transferred to other regions. Second is
value that ‘‘leaks’’ to other subjects in the host region, such as households, suppliers, and
universities, through various channels, including employee compensation, corporate taxes,
regional sourcing, or localized knowledge spillovers. Value is captured at various geographic
scales. Proﬁts reinvested into the establishment of a new plant or the expansion and
upgrading of an existing plant aﬀect the factory site at the local scale; jobs and wages
aﬀect the labor market at the regional scale through labor commute; corporate taxes are
collected at the national scale; and domestic sourcing aﬀects value capture at various scales
from local to national, depending on the sourcing patterns of individual ﬁrms. Therefore, if
we subtract this captured value from the total created value, we get the amount of ‘‘lost’’
value, which is transferred outside the region through various mechanisms, such as proﬁt
repatriation, transfer pricing, and the transfer of a subsidiary’s perceived used value and its
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Table 1. Firm-level indicators for measuring value creation and value capture.
Indicator

Definition

Value added in production
Labor productivity

Value added/production (%)
Value added per employee (thousand
CZK)
Average monthly wages per employee
(CZK)
Corporate tax revenues per employee
(thousand CZK)
Total wages/production (%)
Corporate tax revenues/production (%)
Tangible assets per employee—growth
index
The share of total value of materials and
services sourced from Czechia of total
value sourced annually (%)

Monthly wages
Tax revenues
Wages in production (%)
Taxes in production (%)
Repeat investment
Domestic sourcing

Value
created

Value
captured

Yes
Yes

No
No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

No

Yes

Notes: Tangible assets ¼ financial value of land, buildings, machines, and equipment.
Source: The authors.

commercialization by the parent company (Barrientos et al., 2011; Milberg and Winkler,
2011; Pavlı́nek and Ženka, 2011).
Wages, corporate tax revenues, reinvested proﬁts, and domestic sourcing are four directly
measurable components of value capture that are interrelated in complex and often
contradictory ways (Table 1). For example, rising wages might decrease a ﬁrm’s
proﬁtability and, therefore, undermine the corporate tax base and vice versa. An increase
in the corporate tax rate may lead to decreasing wages in an open economy because of falling
marginal labor productivity and the consequent outﬂow of capital to lower tax countries
(Felix, 2009). There is also a trade-oﬀ between corporate tax revenues and proﬁt
reinvestments into expansions and/or upgrading of individual plants that reduce the
corporate tax base. At the same time, proﬁt reinvestments, which increase capital and
technology intensity of production, should lead to increases in marginal labor
productivity and, therefore, wages. Proﬁt reinvestments may also increase the
embeddedness of plants in particular locations (Wren and Jones, 2009) by fostering local
linkages and developing nonproduction functions.

Wages
A monopoly position that is derived mostly from technological or branding innovations
generates an excess rent (Kaplinsky, 1998). In an integrated monopoly ﬁrm, the excess rent is
likely to translate into higher wages for all workers, including unskilled workers who are
employed in routine low value-added activities (Nathan and Sarkar, 2011). When routine
low-value added and easily replaceable activities are outsourced to external suppliers, there is
no excess rent and wages tend to be lower for workers in supplier ﬁrms that take on
outsourced activities (Nathan and Sarkar, 2011). Therefore, if we were to control for size,
industry, and regional speciﬁcs, we would expect the corporate power and the presence or
absence of strategic nonproduction functions to be key factors that inﬂuence wage levels at
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the ﬁrm level in the context of a particular economy. Lower tier ﬁrms that are engaged in
routine low-value added activities with low entry barriers have generally the lowest wages
and worst prospects for wage increases (Ženka and Pavlı́nek, 2013).

Profits and corporate tax revenues
Proﬁts generated in the host economy can be reinvested or used to pay for corporate income
taxes there or can be repatriated and invested abroad (UNCTAD, 2013). Reinvestment and
corporate taxes contribute to value capture in the host economy while proﬁt repatriation
transfers the value abroad. The share of repatriated proﬁts is aﬀected by the nature of the
activities conducted by foreign ﬁrms in host economies and by the position of foreign
subsidiaries in the corporate hierarchy. The value is also transferred from host economies
by TNCs through various proﬁt shifting strategies, including transfer pricing (Dicken, 2011;
Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). Overall, approximately 60% of
global FDI income on equity was transferred back to home countries of foreign investors in
2010 (UNCTAD, 2013). Regions that host corporate headquarters tend to capture a higher
share of value than those hosting subsidiaries because corporate headquarters concentrate
on the production of intangible goods. As such, they tend to be more proﬁtable than their
subsidiaries and tend to pay higher taxes (Dischinger et al., 2014a, 2014b; Mudambi, 2008).
The headquarters and their geographic vicinity also beneﬁt from high expenditures of gross
proﬁts on high value-added functions, such as R&D and corporate support functions,
including strategic planning, marketing, management, and administration (Dedrick et al.,
2011; Pavlı́nek, 2012). Overall, countries and regions beneﬁt signiﬁcantly more from hosting
TNC headquarters than subsidiaries that have similar ﬁrm characteristics (Dischinger et al.,
2014a).
Reinvested proﬁts can increase value capture in host regions in a number of ways. For
example, the investment in a more advanced technology should translate into higher
marginal labor productivity and higher wages (Szalavetz, 2005). Repeat investments can
also enhance ties of foreign-owned plants to particular regional economies and extend the
survival time durations of foreign-owned plants in host regions (Wren and Jones, 2009). We
measure reinvested proﬁts indirectly through the annual change in tangible assets, which
includes repeated investment into buildings, machines and equipment, and also their
depreciation. We use tangible assets as a proxy measure of reinvested proﬁts due to their
spatial ﬁxity and despite the fact that reinvested proﬁts are only partially reﬂected in the
annual change in tangible assets. The annual change in tangible assets represents a part of
value captured in the host region, while the depreciation of tangible assets represents value
that is sunk and, therefore, lost both for the region and for the ﬁrm (Melachroinos and
Spence, 1999). In addition to tangible assets, reinvested proﬁts may also ﬂow into the
employee training, licenses, software, and other intangibles.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no coherent theoretical framework linking the
position of ﬁrms within GPNs with the amount of value captured through corporate tax
revenues. There is no systematic evidence that higher tier ﬁrms are more prone to proﬁt
shifting and tax avoidance than lower tier ﬁrms. Therefore, we assume that the distribution
of corporate tax revenues along the value chain follows the distribution of proﬁts. Highly
proﬁtable assemblers and Tier 1 suppliers should pay higher taxes per employee than lower
tier ﬁrms. At the same time, we assume that foreign ﬁrms are more likely to engage in proﬁt
shifting and tax avoidance strategies than domestic ﬁrms. The concentration of domestic
ﬁrms among Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers should therefore translate into their higher relative
corporate tax revenues as a share of total production than among higher tier ﬁrms.
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Domestic sourcing
We consider the extent of domestic sourcing a measure of value capture for two basic
reasons (Table 1). First, domestic procurement stimulates job creation among local
suppliers and linkages between foreign and domestic ﬁrms that might help facilitate
spillovers and knowledge transfer from foreign to domestic ﬁrms (Blomström and Kokko,
1998; Görg and Strobl, 2005; Pavlı́nek and Žı́žalová, 2014; Santangelo, 2009; Scott-Kennel,
2007; UNCTAD, 2001). Second, increased production by domestic suppliers improves their
internal scale economies, while the spatial concentration of suppliers in the proximity of
assembly plants can contribute to the development of external scale (localization) economies
(Frigant and Lung, 2002; Larsson, 2002). In the contemporary automotive industry, spatial
proximity to assembly operations is especially important for module and Tier 1 suppliers
that produce modules and components dedicated to a particular automaker and supply them
sequentially just in time (JIT) (Frigant and Lung, 2002; Klier and Rubenstein, 2008). The
geographic proximity of Tier 1 suppliers to assembly operations decreases transportation
and logistical costs, allows for the better synchronization of their production, improves the
ability of Tier 1 suppliers to quickly react to changes in the production scheduling of
assemblers, increases the reliability of JIT delivery, and speeds up the delivery of technical
assistance by Tier 1 suppliers to assembly ﬁrms (Frigant and Lung, 2002; Larsson, 2002;
Pavlı́nek and Janák, 2007). A large volume vehicle assembly should therefore translate in a
high share of preassembled modules and dedicated components being sourced by assembly
ﬁrms from the host economy in which the assembly plant is located.
Tier 1 suppliers supply preassembled highly customized modules that are often color and
model speciﬁc in the JIT regime to a particular automaker. We expect Tier 1 suppliers to
import more components from abroad than vehicle assemblers. This is because high valueadded and sophisticated components for Tier 1 suppliers may not be available from domestic
ﬁrms and standardized, nondedicated and simple components supplied by Tier 3 to Tier 1
suppliers can be supplied from larger distances. The sourcing patterns of simple components
are therefore more aﬀected by scale economies and labor costs than geographic proximity.
Tier 2 suppliers should be positioned somewhere between Tier 1 and Tier 3 suppliers
(see Pavlı́nek and Žı́žalová, 2014). At the same time, the globalization of the supplier base
(Sturgeon and Lester, 2004) has relegated the majority of domestic suppliers to the supply of
simple, low value-added components in less developed economies (Barnes and Kaplinsky,
2000; Humphrey, 2000; Humphrey et al., 2000). As a result, domestic suppliers may lack
capabilities to supply certain specialized or sophisticated components or are uncompetitive
because of their small scale of production, which necessitates the import of such components
from abroad (Crone and Watts, 2003; Pavlı́nek and Žı́žalová, 2014, 2009–2011 interviews).
However, the position of ﬁrms in GPNs has to be controlled for contingent characteristics
that may aﬀect the relationship between the tier and the extent of local sourcing, such as
plant size and its age, the mode of entry of foreign ﬁrms, the ﬁrm’s nationality, and its
corporate sourcing strategies (Barkley and McNamara, 1994; Crone and Watts, 2003;
Tavares and Young, 2006). Larger plants tend to source domestically relatively less than
smaller ones because it is often diﬃcult to ﬁnd local suppliers capable of supplying the large
volumes required. In those cases when assembly ﬁrms and Tier 1 suppliers are signiﬁcantly
larger than Tier 2 and 3 suppliers, the plant size may negatively aﬀect their level of domestic
sourcing. The linkages and sourcing relationships between foreign and domestic ﬁrms
typically develop over time (Dicken, 2011). Older plants and plants acquired by TNCs
show a generally higher propensity to source domestically than more recently established
greenﬁeld factories (Tavares and Young, 2006). However, local content requirements and
follow sourcing often result in high levels of local content as the outcome of the localization
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of foreign-owned suppliers around new greenﬁeld assembly plants, which do not have to
translate in extensive supplier linkages between foreign ﬁrms and domestic suppliers
(Pavlı́nek et al., 2009).

Hypotheses
Based on the discussion of the literature, we present ﬁve hypotheses about diﬀerent tiers and
ﬁrm ownership of the automotive value chain that we will test on the Czech automotive
industry. First, higher tier ﬁrms create higher value than lower tier ﬁrms and, therefore, they
gradually increase their share of the total value added in the automotive industry. This is
because higher tier ﬁrms produce more complex and higher value-added components than
lower tier ﬁrms (Humphrey and Memedovic, 2003; Maxton and Wormald, 2004; Pavlı́nek
and Janák, 2007). Together with assemblers, they wield greater corporate power in
automotive value chains, which they use to maintain their privileged position and to
squeeze lower tier ﬁrms (Pavlı́nek, 2015; Ravenhill, 2014; Sturgeon et al., 2008). Second,
domestic suppliers import a lower share of inputs from abroad than foreign suppliers
because foreign suppliers are more aﬀected by the centralized sourcing strategies of TNCs
(Pavlı́nek and Žı́žalová, 2014). Third, higher tier ﬁrms and assemblers import a lower share
of inputs from abroad than lower tier ﬁrms because they are forced to source greater shares
of their inputs locally in order to satisfy the imperatives of modular and JIT production
(Frigant and Lung, 2002; Pavlı́nek and Janák, 2007). Fourth, higher tier ﬁrms possess
stronger and more diverse competencies that are reﬂected in the presence of more
nonproduction (strategic) higher value added functions than in lower tier ﬁrms. Lower
tier ﬁrms produce simple components and are often captive suppliers that depend on
higher tier buyers for various nonproduction functions (Gereﬃ et al., 2005; Pavlı́nek and
Žı́žalová, 2014). Fifth, higher tier ﬁrms capture a greater share of created value than lower
tier ﬁrms because they conduct more nonproduction higher value-added functions
(Mudambi, 2008) and because they are able to oﬀer higher wages than lower tier ﬁrms in
order to attract skilled labor. This is because jobs in nonproduction functions create greater
value and tend to be better paid than production jobs. Furthermore, the presence of
nonproduction functions increases the chances for the reinvestment of proﬁts in a
particular locality. Better paid jobs and increased chances for reinvestment have
potentially important implications for regional and national economies.

The Czech automotive industry
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we ﬁrst need to provide a brief context of the Czech
automotive industry. Since the early 1990s, the Czech automotive industry has been
integrated in the European production networks through large inﬂows of FDI (CNB,
2015). Czechia had the largest automotive FDI stock (E10.1bn) and largest per capita
FDI in the automotive industry (E963) in East-Central Europe (ECE) in 2012.2 Large
FDI inﬂows resulted in rapid increase in production from 197,000 vehicles in 1991 to 1.25
million in 2014 (AIA, 2015; OICA, 2015).
Here, we will only brieﬂy characterize the structure of the Czech automotive industry,
since we have analyzed its foreign capital-driven restructuring, growth, and upgrading
elsewhere (e.g. Pavlı́nek, 2008, 2015; Pavlı́nek and Ženka, 2011; Pavlı́nek and Žı́žalová,
2014). The classiﬁcation of Czech-based automotive ﬁrms into assemblers and three basic
supplier tiers illustrates its hierarchical structure, in which the number of ﬁrms in individual
tiers increases with the decreasing tier, while the average ﬁrm size, measured by the number
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Table 2. Shares of individual supplier tiers on selected indicators of the total Czech automotive industry in
2008–2010.
Tier

Number of
Value
firms
Employment Production added

Corporate
Tangible R&D
Wages tax revenues assets
expenditures

All firms
Assembly
Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3

475
9
49
148
269

49,054
25.1%
26.6%
24.2%
24.2%

157,950
20.9%
25.3%
26.4%
27.4%

677,797
40.0%
24.4%
18.2%
17.5%

128,812
33.4%
24.6%
21.3%
20.7%

5051
52.6%
14.6%
15.3%
17.6%

199,138
35.0%
25.5%
22.1%
17.4%

9458
59.2%
17.5%
10.9%
12.4%

Notes: Financial indicators in mil. CZK; shares are calculated as mean values for 2008, 2009, and 2010 with the exception
of corporate tax revenues, which are mean values for 2008–2009 and R&D expenditures, which are mean values for 2005,
2006, and 2007.
Source: Calculated by the authors based on data from CSO (2011).

Table 3. Descriptive statistics for different tiers of Czech-based automotive firms (mean values for 2006,
2007, and 2008) (value creation and value capture).
Employment
per firm

Production
per worker

Value added
per worker

Wages per
worker

Taxes per
worker

Tangible assets
per worker

MEAN STDEV MEAN STDEV MEAN STDEV MEAN STDEV MEAN STDEV MEAN STDEV
Assembly
Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3
All firms

3581
879
318
184
362

7697
1224
418
341
1231

5463
3996
2395
1824
2295

3972
3567
2836
1580
2466

952
670
559
474
530

391
415
359
287
338

309
272
240
231
240

55
60
62
61
63

79
36
26
18
24

69
60
56
33
46

1397
927
683
461
596

1384
653
658
499
622

Notes: STDEV ¼ standard deviation. Taxes refer to corporate tax revenues.
Source: Calculated by the authors based on data from CSO (2011).

of workers, decreases (Tables 2 and 3). When measured by employment, assemblers are on
average four times larger than Tier 1 suppliers, 11 times larger than Tier 2 suppliers, and
almost 22 times larger than Tier 3 suppliers. The data also reveal large diﬀerences between
lead ﬁrms and their suppliers. On average, assemblers have a much higher capital and
technological intensity of production than suppliers, which translates into higher labor
productivity; high shares of overall production; value-added, tangible assets; and R&D
expenditures of the Czech automotive industry (Table 2). However, there is a signiﬁcant
variability within individual tiers. Mean values for assemblers are distorted by Škoda Auto
because it accounts for 27% of production, 25% of value added, 67% of R&D expenditures,
18% of wages, and 40% of corporate tax revenues of the total Czech automotive industry.
Overall, the diﬀerence between Škoda Auto and the rest of the Czech-based automotive
industry is larger than diﬀerences between individual supplier tiers (Ženka and Pavlı́nek,
2013). Škoda Auto is also unique in the context of the Czech automotive industry because it
is what we call a Tier 2 lead ﬁrm; a ﬁrm that has many attributes of lead ﬁrms and possesses
important nonproduction functions. However, strategic functions and autonomy of Tier 2
lead ﬁrms are limited because they are foreign owned, which also aﬀects their value capture
by proﬁt repatriation. The ultimate strategic functions are missing and conducted abroad
by foreign owners, which is Volkswagen in the case of Škoda Auto (Pavlı́nek, 2012;
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Pavlı́nek and Janák, 2007). Still, Škoda Auto possesses signiﬁcantly more nonproduction
functions and competencies than a typical foreign assembly ﬁrm, such as Hyundai and the
Toyota–Peugeot–Citroën joint venture (TPCA) in the case of Czechia, because it is a distinct
brand within the VW group.

Value creation and value capture in the Czech automotive industry
Our analysis of value creation and value capture in the Czech automotive industry draws on
a unique 2011 dataset of 475 Czech-based automotive ﬁrms with 20 or more employees that
was constructed by the authors from the data provided by the Czech Statistical Oﬃce (CSO,
2011). In addition to narrowly deﬁned automotive industry ﬁrms (NACE 29), the database
includes employment and ﬁnancial indicators for ﬁrms in related supplier sectors, such as
iron and steel, rubber and plastic, electronics and machinery industries, for 1998, 2002, and
2005–2011. Additional data, such as the share of automotive products in sales, sourcing
patterns, and high value-added functions conducted at the ﬁrm level, were collected through
a 2009 telephonic survey of 475 ﬁrms in our database, which was administered by the
authors and yielded a response rate of 34.6% (274 ﬁrms). Finally, the interpretation of
data analysis beneﬁted from 100 ﬁrm-level interviews with the directors and top managers
of Czech-based automotive ﬁrms conducted by the authors between 2009 and 2011.
Individual ﬁrms were classiﬁed into ﬁve categories according to the share of automotive
products in their sales (0–24.9, 25.0–49.9, 50.0–74.9, 75.0–99.9, and 100%). The data for
every ﬁrm were then weighted by a corresponding weight (0.125, 0.375, 0.625, 0.875, and 1)
in order to reduce distortions resulting from the inclusion of ﬁrms that are only partially
engaged in the automotive industry. In the next step, we classiﬁed all 475 ﬁrms according to
their position in the automotive value chain into lead ﬁrms (assemblers) and three supplier
tiers according to the technological complexity of their components (Humphrey and
Memedovic, 2003; Maxton and Wormald, 2004; Pavlı́nek and Janák, 2007; Pavlı́nek
et al., 2009; Veloso and Kumar, 2002).3 Tier 1 suppliers supply the most complex
components, such as sophisticated parts of engines (compressors, turbochargers),
transmissions and brakes, and complex preassembled modules, such as dashboards, door
systems, or seats. Tier 3 suppliers produce the least complex parts and components, such as
car bodies and their parts, metal and plastic pressings, exhaust pipes, windscreen wipers, and
simple interior parts, such as seat upholstery. We are including weighted data for raw
materials suppliers among Tier 3 suppliers. Tier 2 suppliers produce the rest, i.e. medium
complex parts, such as simple engine parts, lights, or locks. We are aware that large
suppliers, such as Bosch, for example, supply various components that diﬀer in terms of
their sophistication. As such, these suppliers may play diﬀerent roles in the value chain as
Tier 1, 2, and 3 suppliers or as system integrators (Frigant, 2011b; Pries, 1999). In those
cases, we have classiﬁed individual suppliers as a whole based on the highest tier into which
at least some of their components would fall since we were unable to determine what
proportion of supplier activity falls under diﬀerent tiers. These three levels of the
complexity of components are related to their value added. Generally, we assume that the
production of the most complex and sophisticated components adds more value than
the production of simple parts and components.

Value creation in the Czech automotive industry
We start with testing the ﬁrst hypothesis: higher tier ﬁrms create higher value than lower tier
ﬁrms and, therefore, they gradually increase their share of the total value added in the
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Table 4. Change in the share of value added (value creation), wages, and corporate tax revenues (value
capture) of the total value of production by supplier tier.
Value added in
production (%)

Wages in
production (%)

Corporate tax revenues
in production (%)

Tier

1998

2010

1998

2010

1998

2009

All firms
Assembly
Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3

22.3
17.1
25.2
31.5
28.7

19.1
16.6
18.0
23.4
22.6

7.2
4.4
9.2
10.1
11.2

6.6
4.1
7.1
9.6
9.1

1.6
1.4
1.9
1.7
1.7

0.6
0.8
0.1
0.5
0.7

Note: Other components of the total value of production, such as the value of purchased materials, components, energy,
and services are not included in the table.
Source: Calculated by the authors based on data from CSO (2011).

automotive industry. Based on the data in Tables 3 and 4, we can arrive at two important
conclusions related to the position of ﬁrms in the supplier hierarchy and their value
creation potential. First, higher tier ﬁrms create a greater value per employee (show
higher labor productivity) than lower tier ﬁrms. Second, the share of value added (created
value) of the total value of production is lower in higher tier ﬁrms than in lower tier ﬁrms
(Table 4).
The stronger economic performance of assemblers and Tier 1 suppliers compared to the
rest of the automotive industry supports the theoretical assumptions of GVC/GPN literature
that link their ‘‘super proﬁts’’ in terms of economic rent to strategic functions and privileged
position in value chains (e.g. Kaplinsky, 1998). Empirical studies have also illustrated how
assemblers and the so-called mega-suppliers wield their corporate power and exercise control
over strategic functions within automotive production networks, which eﬀectively
discourages lower tier suppliers from functional upgrading (e.g. Pavlı́nek and Ženka,
2011; Rutherford and Holmes, 2008). They also squeeze lower tier suppliers often to the
brink of bankruptcy, especially during economic crises, in order to maximize their own
proﬁts (Pavlı́nek, 2015; Pavlı́nek and Ženka, 2010). This was reﬂected in a very uneven
decrease in the proﬁtability in the Czech automotive industry during the economic crisis
in 2008 as it fell on average by 19% for assemblers, 59% for Tier 1 suppliers, 73% for Tier 2
suppliers, and by 71% for Tier 3 suppliers (Pavlı́nek, 2015).

1998–2010 changes in value creation by supplier tiers
In the next step, we consider changes in the value creation indicators by individual tiers
during the 1998–2010 period. Our previous research on upgrading in the Czech automotive
industry has identiﬁed the two prevailing trends (Pavlı́nek and Ženka, 2011). The ﬁrst one
was the highly selective functional upgrading that was limited mostly to Škoda Auto and a
few of the largest Tier 1 suppliers. It contributed to the increasing productivity and
proﬁtability gaps between assemblers and Tier 1 suppliers on one hand and lower tier
suppliers on the other hand. The second trend was the widespread process and product
upgrading among domestic Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers following their integration into
GPNs and the pressure to increase the eﬃciency and quality of their production. As a
result, domestic Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers outpaced foreign-owned ﬁrms in the rates of
growth of labor productivity.
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Table 5. The development of labor productivity (value creation), annual wages, and corporate taxes
revenues per employee (value capture) by supplier tier, 1998–2010/2009 (in thousands of CZK).
Labor productivity

Annual wages

Corporate taxes revenues

Tier

1998

2010

% change

1998

2010

% change

1998

2009

% change

Assembly
Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3
All firms

803
429
451
380
514

1549
892
725
714
749

93
108
61
88
83

207
157
145
148
165

385
349
298
288
327

86
123
105
94
99

68
29
28
23
37

60
4
15
18
23

12
87
46
19
37

Source: Calculated by the authors based on data from CSO (2011).

Labor productivity increased by 83% for the automotive industry as a whole between
1998 and 2010. It grew fastest among Tier 1 suppliers (by 108%) and assemblers (by 93%)
(Table 5). The share of value added in production, which is an indicator of value creation,
decreased by 14% for the automotive industry as whole between 1998 and 2010. The decrease
was the most pronounced for Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers (Table 4). The decreasing share of
value added in production does not indicate downgrading but the FDI-driven extensive
growth of the Czech automotive industry between 1998 and 2010 (Ženka and Pavlı́nek,
2013). During this period, the number of automotive ﬁrms increased from 257 to 475, their
total employment increased by 68%, production by 259%, and value added by 207%. Tier 2
suppliers grew the fastest of all automotive tiers with their production increasing more than
four times (by 414%) and employment more than doubled (by 138%). The rapid growth of
Tier 2 suppliers between 1998 and 2010 resulted especially from the establishment of new
greenﬁeld branch plants by global suppliers in Czechia.
Overall, the value creation in the Czech automotive industry signiﬁcantly increased during
the 1998–2010 period. Did this increased value creation lead to increased value capture in
Czechia? We consider this question in the next section.

Value capture in the Czech automotive industry
Domestic suppliers source a higher share of components, materials, and services in Czechia
than Czech-based foreign suppliers (Table 6), which conﬁrms our second hypothesis. The
share of domestically sourced components and materials does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer by tier
among domestic ﬁrms. Among foreign ﬁrms, however, higher tier ﬁrms source a higher share
of components, materials, and services in Czechia than lower tier ﬁrms. This therefore
conﬁrms our third hypothesis that higher tier ﬁrms and assemblers import a lower share
of inputs from abroad than lower tier ﬁrms only for foreign ﬁrms. The high share of
domestically sourced components by foreign assembly ﬁrms and also Tier 1 suppliers is
related to the imperatives of JIT production in the automotive industry (Sheard, 1983).
Tier 3 suppliers, who supply standardized, simple, and slow changing components, have
the lowest share of domestic sourcing. This is because these components are not typically
supplied in the JIT regime and, as such, could be supplied over long distances from lower cost
countries, such as China and India. The second reason for the lowest share of components that
are sourced from the domestic economy by Tier 3 suppliers is the unavailability of some parts
and raw materials in Czechia, such as electronic components, admixtures for special plastics
and natural rubber (Pavlı́nek and Žı́žalová, 2014). The centralized procurement by TNCs
strongly inﬂuences sourcing patterns of all foreign ﬁrms. Czech-based subsidiaries typically
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Table 6. The percentage share of components sourced from Czechia in
2009 by supplier tier (value capture).
Tier

Domestic

Foreign

Total

Assembly
Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3
All firms

–
61.9
59.0
64.3
62.3

67.6
49.5
37.2
34.6
44.2

67.6
49.8
40.7
44.2
46.8

Source: 2009 Authors’ survey.

have no or very limited inﬂuence over sourcing decisions of the vast majority of components
and materials they use in production (2009–2011 interviews). Overall, therefore, higher tier
foreign ﬁrms have the potential to generate greater regional economic eﬀects than lower tier
foreign ﬁrms by sourcing more from the host economy.
Reinvested proﬁts represent an important component of value capture in the Czech
automotive industry. As of 2013, the total FDI stock in the narrowly deﬁned Czech
automotive industry stood at E9.6bn, of which E7.3bn (76%) was in the form of
reinvested proﬁts. Total repatriated proﬁts stood at E4.4bn, which means that the total
amount of reinvested proﬁts exceeded repatriated proﬁts almost 1.7 times (CNB, 2015).
The share of wages of the value of total production did not change signiﬁcantly between
1998 and 2010. The total value of wages increased in a similar rate as the overall volume of
production during this period. The total employment grew more slowly (by 68%) than
average nominal wages per employee (by 99%). However, the share of corporate taxes of
the value of total production decreased from 1.6 to 0.6% between 1998 and 2009 for three
basic reasons (Ženka and Pavlı́nek, 2013): First, the Czech corporate tax rate decreased by
40% (from 35 to 21%) between 1998 and 2008. Second, Czechia introduced a generous
system of investment incentives in 1998 (see Pavlı́nek and Ženka, 2011), which provided a
corporate tax relief for foreign investors. Third, the proﬁt repatriation abroad in the form of
dividends increased rapidly in the 2000s and peaked during the economic crisis in 2008 and
2009 when it reached E813m and E754m, respectively. The 1998–2012 data thus suggest that
the overall value capture in the Czech automotive industry tended to decrease during this
period despite large FDI inﬂows.
Between 1998 and 2010, Tier 1 suppliers experienced the fastest increase in wages per
employee (by 123%), while assemblers experienced the slowest (by 86%) (Table 5).
Consequently, the wage gap between assemblers and suppliers slightly narrowed during
this period. In contrast, the gap between assemblers and suppliers signiﬁcantly increased
in corporate taxes per employee (Table 5), which illustrates the ability of assemblers to
concentrate increasing shares of proﬁts at the expense of their suppliers. At the same
time, assemblers, who accounted for 18.2% of the total automotive employment and
47.3% of total proﬁts, accounted for 49.8% of corporate tax revenues between 2006 and
2008. Diﬀerent tiers thus contribute to value capture and, consequently, regional
development potential in diﬀerent ways. While foreign assemblers and Tier 1 suppliers
account for a disproportionately high share of total corporate tax revenues in the
automotive industry, Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers are much more important in terms of the
number of jobs they generate and related wage eﬀects.
The data from the Czech automotive industry suggest that the stronger economic
performance of assemblers and Tier 1 suppliers does not result solely from their corporate
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Table 7. The percentage of automotive firms conducting selected high value-added functions in Czechia by
supplier tier in 2009.
Functions and competencies

Assembly

Tier 1

Tier 2

Tier 3

Strategic and marketing planning
Supplier selection
Decisions about what will be produced
Investment decisions
Market research
Price setting for produced goods
Marketing of subsidiary products
R&D, design
Product distribution
Sale and after-sale services
Organization of production
Accounting and financial operations

42.9
42.9
42.9
57.1
71.4
71.4
71.4
71.4
71.4
71.4
85.7
85.7

44.0
52.0
48.0
44.0
34.8
56.0
44.0
58.3
87.5
59.1
100.0
100.0

58.9
75.0
63.6
60.7
76.8
73.2
67.9
63.6
87.5
76.8
100.0
100.0

67.3
65.4
64.7
66.3
65.0
67.3
62.5
64.0
69.9
64.4
91.1
90.9

Notes: The number of firms answering individual questions ranged from 150 (for accounting and financial operations) to
192 (for strategic and marketing planning, decisions about what products will be produced, supplier selection, price setting
for produced goods, and marketing of subsidiary products).
Source: 2009 Authors’ survey.

power, privileged position in the value chain, highly sophisticated production, and control of
high value-added strategic functions. Many Czech-based foreign-owned assemblers and Tier
1 suppliers are actually typiﬁed by the low to medium value-added production in assembly
branch plants with very limited or no strategic functions, because these are located in
corporate headquarters in countries of their principal owners. Overall, assemblers and
Tier 1 suppliers in the Czech automotive industry do not generally perform more strategic
nonproduction functions than lower tier ﬁrms (Table 7). Instead, their strong position in the
automotive value chain derives from the high capital and technology intensity of production,
which is based on the transfer of highly advanced technology, machinery, and production
processes from their foreign parent companies. The capital intensity of production is
considered to be a strong predictor of labor productivity and process upgrading
(Szalavetz, 2005). Nevertheless, in the case of assemblers and to a lesser extent also Tier 1
suppliers, a low share of value added, wages, and taxes of the overall value of production
(Table 4) results from the combination of high capital intensity and intensive outsourcing of
the production of components. Assemblers and large Tier 1 suppliers spend very high shares
of their overall expenditures on the material, energy, components, and services, while their
share of wage expenditures is usually less than 10% (Table 4). It means that lower supplier
tiers have larger direct employment and wage eﬀects per unit of production and also per unit
of invested capital than higher tiers. In 2010, the ratio of total annual wages per unit of
tangible assets was 0.17 for assemblers, 0.20 for Tier 1 suppliers, 0.29 for Tier 2 suppliers,
and 0.34 for Tier 3 suppliers. At the same time, however, lower tiers have lower wages and
lower corporate tax revenues per employee than higher tiers, which means that their ability
to capture and appropriate value per employee is lower than for assemblers and higher
tier ﬁrms.

Strategic nonproduction functions and competencies in the Czech automotive industry
Finally, we evaluate the presence of nonproduction functions and competencies in Czechbased automotive ﬁrms in order to test our fourth and ﬁfth hypotheses. We assume that
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strategic nonproduction functions activities contribute to value creation and value capture
more than production activities (Mudambi, 2008). Our 2009 survey collected the data about
strategic nonproduction functions conducted by individual ﬁrms. Depending on a particular
function, between 150 and 192 ﬁrms replied whether or not they performed each of 12
diﬀerent functions. These functions represent high value-added activities that are typically
associated with high-paid professional jobs. As such, the presence or absence of these
functions at individual ﬁrms has potentially important implications for their value
creation and value capture. However, we need to stress that our data refer only to the
presence or absence of these functions and do not provide any information about their
extent within individual ﬁrms. We are also aware that ﬁrms would tend to exaggerate
rather than understate the presence and importance of these activities. Therefore, our
data should be interpreted with caution as the representation of general trends rather
than exact measurements.
Our fourth hypothesis argues that higher tier ﬁrms possess stronger and more diverse
competencies, which are reﬂected in the presence of more nonproduction (strategic) higher
value-added functions than in lower tier ﬁrms. However, our data revealed that on average,
Tier 1 suppliers conduct the lowest number of nonproduction functions in Czechia (61% of
yes answers of those who answered when asked about individual functions), followed by
assemblers with 66%. Therefore, we have to reject the fourth hypothesis. The main reason
for a slightly higher number of functions conducted by Tier 2 suppliers (75%) and Tier 3
suppliers (70%) is a higher share of domestic ﬁrms among these lower tier suppliers (Table
7). The diﬀerences between domestic and foreign ﬁrms within individual tiers are more
pronounced and, on average, 82% of domestic ﬁrms conduct strategic nonproduction
functions in Czechia compared to 59% of foreign ﬁrms (Table 8).

Table 8. The percentage of automotive firms conducting selected high value-added functions in Czechia by
ownership and supplier tier in 2009.
Assembly

Tier 1

Tier 2

Tier 3

Functions and competencies

F

D

F

D

F

D

F

D

Strategic and marketing planning
Investment decisions
Supplier selection
Organization of production
Market research
Decisions about what will be produced
Price setting for produced goods
Marketing of subsidiary products
Accounting and financial operations
R&D, design
Product distribution
Sale and after-sale services
Average

0
25
0
75
50
0
50
50
75
50
50
50
40

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

33
33
43
100
25
38
48
33
100
50
85
50
53

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

34
38
59
100
63
41
56
50
100
45
81
66
61

92
92
96
100
96
96
96
92
100
88
96
92
94

60
55
55
93
54
56
57
50
92
53
66
57
62

73
74
73
90
73
70
74
71
90
71
73
69
75

Notes: F denotes foreign firms, D denotes domestic firms. The number of firms answering individual questions ranged
from 150 (for accounting and financial operations) to 192 (for strategic and marketing planning, decisions about what
products will be produced, supplier selection, price setting for produced goods, and marketing of subsidiary products).
Source: 2009 Authors’ survey.
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There are important diﬀerences among individual supplier tiers and between foreign and
domestic ﬁrms. Among foreign ﬁrms, higher tier ﬁrms on average conduct fewer
nonproduction functions than lower tier ﬁrms, suggesting that higher tier foreign suppliers
are more tightly integrated into transnational corporate production networks and controlled
from abroad. The opposite situation is true for domestic ﬁrms because higher tier domestic
ﬁrms conduct more functions than lower tier ﬁrms (Table 8). Higher tier domestic ﬁrms
cannot stay competitive and survive without R&D and other nonproduction functions
(2009–2011 interviews). Lower tier domestic ﬁrms, especially Tier 3 suppliers, are often
captive suppliers that depend for many nonproduction functions on higher tier buyers of
their components (Gereﬃ et al., 2005; Pavlı́nek and Žı́žalová, 2014), which explains why
domestic Tier 3 suppliers reported the lowest share of nonproduction functions of all tiers.
Small sample size aﬀects the results for foreign assemblers. There is a diﬀerence between
foreign assemblers that were taken over by foreign TNCs and kept certain strategic functions
in what has been previously called embedded path-dependent transformations (Pavlı́nek,
2002), such as Škoda Auto and Iveco (former Karosa), and new greenﬁeld assembly plants,
such as TPCA and Hyundai that lack these functions and have no plans to develop them
(2009–2011 interviews). Although higher tier ﬁrms capture a greater share of created value
than lower tier ﬁrms, it is not because they conduct more nonproduction functions. Our data
only conﬁrm that assembly and Tier 1 ﬁrms pay signiﬁcantly higher wages per employee than
Tier 2 and Tier 3 ﬁrms (Table 5). Therefore, we have to reject the ﬁfth hypothesis that higher
tier ﬁrms capture a greater share of created value than lower tier ﬁrms because higher tier
ﬁrms conduct more nonproduction functions and oﬀer higher wages than lower tier ﬁrms.

Conclusion
In this article, we set out to evaluate the value creation and capture in the Czech automotive
industry by diﬀerent tiers of automotive ﬁrms. We empirically tested whether two theoretical
assumptions apply in the automotive industry in the context of integrated peripheral
markets. First, whether higher tier ﬁrms create and capture higher value than lower tier
ﬁrms because they produce more complex components and possess a strong bargaining
power that allows them to squeeze their suppliers (Sturgeon et al., 2008). Second, whether
intangible knowledge-based assets and strategic nonproduction functions represent a key
source of value added for higher tier ﬁrms (Mudambi, 2008).
Our analysis suggests that the economic eﬀects of the automotive industry largely depend
on its capital intensity of production, especially in terms of wages and value added per
employee, which tend to increase with the increasing capital intensity of production and
vice versa. Since the highest capital intensity of production is found among assemblers and
Tier 1 suppliers, these ﬁrms should have stronger economic eﬀects than lower tier suppliers.
Additionally, assemblers and Tier 1 suppliers account for much higher corporate tax
revenues than lower tier suppliers and they have higher average wages per worker. This
also points toward stronger economic eﬀects of assemblers and Tier 1 suppliers than Tier 2
and Tier 3 suppliers. However, the vast majority of assemblers and Tier 1 suppliers are
foreign owned in the Czech automotive industry, which has two important implications.
First, Czech-based subsidiaries of foreign lead ﬁrms and Tier 1 suppliers primarily
concentrate on export-oriented assembly and production and their strategic
nonproduction functions are weakly developed. Second, an increase in value creation by
foreign ﬁrms does not necessarily have to translate into an increase in value capture because
of proﬁt repatriation, tax holidays, and other proﬁt shifting strategies employed by foreign
ﬁrms. At the same time, lower tier suppliers have larger direct employment and wage eﬀects
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per unit of production and investment capital than higher tier suppliers. This is important
for regional development since Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers are much more numerous, more
spatially dispersed, and received on average signiﬁcantly lower investment incentives per
newly created job than assemblers and Tier 1 ﬁrms.
The data analysis from the Czech automotive industry conﬁrmed our ﬁrst hypothesis that
higher tier ﬁrms generate greater value per employee than lower tier ﬁrms. As a result, their
share of the total value added in the automotive industry has been increasing. Our data also
conﬁrmed the second hypothesis that domestic suppliers import a lower share of inputs than
foreign suppliers. Our third hypothesis that higher tier ﬁrms import lower shares of inputs
than lower tier ﬁrms was conﬁrmed for foreign but not domestic ﬁrms. Therefore, it has to be
rejected. Nevertheless, in the case of foreign ﬁrms, a higher share of domestic sourcing by
assemblers and Tier 1 suppliers is another supporting evidence of higher tier foreign ﬁrms
creating and capturing greater value than lower tier suppliers as conﬁrmed by the ﬁrst
hypothesis. Our fourth hypothesis arguing that higher tier ﬁrms possess stronger and
more diverse competencies that are reﬂected in the presence of more nonproduction
(strategic) higher value-added functions than in lower tier ﬁrms has to be rejected since
higher tier foreign ﬁrms conduct fewer nonproduction functions than lower tier foreign
ﬁrms in the Czech automotive industry. Parent companies typically conduct these
functions for higher tier foreign ﬁrms abroad. We also have to reject our ﬁfth hypothesis.
Higher tier ﬁrms capture a greater share of created value than lower tier ﬁrms because they
oﬀer higher wages than lower tier ﬁrms but not because they conduct more nonproduction
higher value-added functions. The rejection of the fourth and ﬁfth hypotheses allows us to
conclude that the high value creation and capture by assemblers and Tier 1 suppliers in the
Czech automotive industry is not a function of the presence of valuable intangible assets and
strategic nonproduction functions. Rather, it is a function of ﬁrm size and capital intensity of
production. A signiﬁcantly larger ﬁrm size contributes to high proﬁtability by allowing
higher tier ﬁrms to capitalize on their internal scale economies and strong purchasing
power, which translates into their very strong bargaining power. The capital intensity of
production can at least partly explain the high labor productivity of higher tier ﬁrms. The
combination of a strong bargaining power with the high capital intensity of production and
high labor productivity is probably the key explaining factor for relatively high wages,
proﬁtability, and corporate tax revenues of higher tier ﬁrms, especially assemblers.
Further empirical research is needed to determine if this ﬁnding will hold in other
integrated peripheral markets. If it does, we can expect a similar distribution of value
creation and capture in countries with a similar or lower concentration of strategic
nonproduction functions in the automotive industry, such as Spain, Portugal, Poland,
Hungary, Slovakia, Mexico, and Thailand.
The greater economic potential of higher tier ﬁrms than lower tier ﬁrms in the automotive
industry has important policy implications for less developed countries. In the absence of a
strong domestic automotive industry, it makes sense to attract foreign assembly ﬁrms
because Tier 1 foreign suppliers will likely follow, which will also encourage foreign Tier
2 and Tier 3 suppliers to invest. Most ECE countries have followed this approach and
engaged in aggressive bidding for foreign assembly plants in the 1990s and 2000s
(Drahokoupil, 2009; Pavlı́nek, 2014). However, less developed countries with a weak
domestic manufacturing sector need to factor in potential long-term less tangible costs of
these FDI-oriented policies, such as increased economic dependence on foreign TNCs,
outﬂow of proﬁts, and the danger of being locked in an unfavorable position in the
international division of labor (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 2009). It is reasonable to expect
that the small and open ECE economies will continue to be heavily inﬂuenced by inﬂows of
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FDI and activities of foreign TNCs in the future. At the same time, the overwhelming
economic dependence on foreign capital and economic control by foreign capital will
make it extremely diﬃcult for ECE to close the economic gap, including the gap in
standards of living, with Western Europe as ECE countries are facing the danger of
falling into the ‘‘middle income trap’’ (e.g. Ravenhill, 2014). A successful long-term
development strategy of the automotive industry should therefore combine the presence of
foreign ﬁrms with a simultaneous promotion of the strong domestic sector. A key policy
issue is ﬁnding a balance between the degree of external control and dependence and
indigenous economic development based upon policies that would allow for a gradual
upgrading of the position of ECE countries in the international division of labor.
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Notes
1. Our approach is different from that of Shin et al. (2012) who use gross profit to measure value
capture rather than value creation.
2. In this article, East-Central Europe refers to the East European member countries of the European
Union that have automobile assembly plants (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia,
Slovakia, and Slovenia) plus Serbia.
3. See Pavlı́nek et al. (2009) and Pavlı́nek and Janák (2007) for a more detailed description.
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